After King George refused to receive the united colonies' petition for peace, known as the Olive Branch Petition, the Americans were deeply angered. Their delegates in Congress sent this response to him, but it didn't change the king's mind either. They tried to avert the Revolutionary War, but because of the king's stubbornness, they were forced to make their Declaration of Independence less than a year later.
"We, the Delegates of the thirteen United Colonies in North America, have
taken into our moƒt ƒerious conƒideration, a Proclamation iƒsued from the Court
of St. James's on the Twenty-Third day of Auguƒt laƒt. The name of Majeƒty is uƒed
to give it a ƒanction and influence; and, on that account, it becomes a matter of
importance to wipe off, in the name of the people of theƒe United Colonies, the
aƒperƒions which it is calculated to throw upon our cauƒe; and to prevent, as far
as poƒsible, the undeƒerved puniƒhments, which it is deƒigned to prepare for our
friends. We are accuƒed of "forgetting the allegiance which we owe to the power
that has protected and ƒuƒtained us." Why all this ambiguity and obƒcurity in what
ought to be ƒo plain and obvious, as that he who runs may read it? What allegiance
is it that we forget? Allegiance to Parliament? We never owed --we never owned it.
Allegiance to our King? Our words have ever avowed it, --our conduct has ever been
conƒiƒtent with it. We condemn, and with arms in our hands, --a reƒource which
Freemen will never part with, --we oppoƒe the claim and exerciƒe of unconƒtitutional
powers, to which neither the Crown nor Parliament were ever entitled. By the Britiƒh
Conƒtitution, our beƒt inheritance, rights, as well as duties, deƒcend upon us:
We cannot violate the latter by defending the former: We should act in diametrical
oppoƒition to both, if we permitted the claims of the Britiƒh Parliament to be
eƒtabliƒhed, and the meaƒures purƒued in conƒequence of thoƒe claims to be carried
into execution among us. Our ƒagacious anceƒtors provided mounds againƒt the
inundation of tyranny and lawleƒs power on one ƒide, as well as againƒt that
of faction and licentiouƒness on the other. On which ƒide has the breach been
made? Is it objected againƒt us by the moƒt inveterate and the moƒt uncandid
of our enemies, that we have oppoƒed any of the juƒt prerogatives of the Crown,
or any legal exertion of thoƒe prerogatives? Why then are we accuƒed of forgetting
our allegiance? We have performed our duty: We have reƒiƒted in thoƒe caƒes, in
which the right to reƒiƒt is ƒtipulated as expreƒsly on our part, as the right
to govern is, in other caƒes, ƒtipulated on the part of the Crown. The breach
of allegiance is removed from our reƒiƒtance as far as tyranny is removed from
legal government. It is alledged, that "we have proceeded to an open and avowed
rebellion." In what does this rebellion conƒiƒt. It is thus deƒcribed --"Arraying
ourƒelves in hoƒtile manner, to withƒtand the execution of the law, and traiterouƒly
preparing, ordering, and levying war againƒt the King." We know of no laws binding
upon us, but ƒuch as have been tranƒmitted to us by our anceƒtors, and ƒuch as
have been conƒented to by ourƒelves, or our repreƒentatives elected for that
purpoƒe. What laws, ƒtamps with theƒe characters, have we withƒtood? We have
indeed defended them; and we will riƒque every thing, do every thing, and
ƒuffer every thing in their defence. To ƒupport our laws, and our liberties
eƒtabliƒhed by our laws, we have prepared, ordered, and levied war: But is this
traiterouƒly, or againƒt the King? We view him as the Conƒtitution repreƒents
him. That tells us he can do no wrong. The cruel and illegal attacks, which we
oppoƒe, have no foundation in the royal authority. We will not, on our part,
loƒe the diƒtinction between the King and his Miniƒters: happy would it have
been for ƒome former Princes, had it been always preƒerved on that part of the
Crown.
Beƒides all this, we obƒerve, on this part of the proclamation, that "rebellion"
is a term undefined and unknown in the law; it might have been expected that a
proclamation, which by the Britiƒh conƒtitution has no other operation than
merely that of enforcing what is already law, would have had a known legal
baƒis to have reƒted upon. A correƒpondence between the inhabitants of Great
Britain and their brethren in America, produced, in better times, much
ƒatiƒfaction to individuals, and much advantage to the public. By what
criterion ƒhall one, who is unwilling to break off this correƒpondence,
and is, at the ƒame time, anxious not to expoƒe himƒelf to the dreadful
conƒequences threatened in this proclamation --by what criterion ƒhall he
regulate his conduct? He is admoniƒhed not to carry on correƒpondence with
the perƒons now in rebellion in the colonies. How ƒhall he aƒcertain who are
in rebellion, and who are not? He conƒults the law to learn the nature of
the ƒuppoƒed crime: the law is ƒilent upon the ƒubject. This, in a country
where it has been often ƒaid, and formerly with juƒtice, that the government
is by law, and not by men, might render him perfectly eaƒy. But proclamations
have been ƒometimes dangerous engines in the hands of thoƒe in power; information
is commanded to be given to one of the Secretaries of State, of all perƒons "who
ƒhall be found carrying on correƒpondence with the perƒons in rebellion, in order
to bring to condign puniƒhment the authors, perpetrators, or abettors, of ƒuch
dangerous deƒigns." Let us ƒuppoƒe, for a moment, that ƒome perƒons in the
colonies are in rebellion, and that thoƒe who carry on correƒpondence with
them, might learn by ƒome rule, which Britons are bound to know, how to
diƒcriminate them; Does it follow that all correƒpondence with them deƒerves
to be puniƒhed? It might have been intended to apprize them of their danger,
and to reclaim them from their crimes. By what law does a correƒpondence with
a criminal tranƒfer or communicate his guilt? We know that thoƒe who aid and
adhere to the King's enemies, and thoƒe who correƒpond with them in order to
enable them to carry their deƒigns into effect, are crimina1 in the eye of the
law. But the law goes no farther. Can proclamations, according to the principles
of reaƒon and juƒtice, and the conƒtitution, go farther than the law?
But, perhaps the principles of reaƒon and juƒtice, and the conƒtitution will
not prevail: Experience ƒuggeƒts to us the doubt: If they ƒhould not, we muƒt
reƒort to arguments drawn from a very different ƒource. We, therefore, in the
name of the people of theƒe United Colonies, and by authority, according to the
pureƒt maxims of repreƒentation, derived from them, declare, that whatever
puniƒhment ƒhall be inflicted upon any perƒons in the power of our enemies
for favouring, aiding, or abetting the cauƒe of American liberty, ƒhall be
retaliated in the ƒame kind, and the ƒame degree upon thoƒe in our power,
who have favoured, aided, or abetted, or ƒhall favour, aid, or abet the ƒyƒtem
of miniƒterial oppreƒsion. The eƒsential difference between our cauƒe, and
that of our enemies, might juƒtify a ƒeverer punishment: The law of retaliation
will unqueƒtionably warrant one equally ƒevere.
We mean not, however, by this declaration, to occaƒion or to multiply puniƒhments:
Our ƒole view is to prevent them. In this unhappy and unnatural controverƒy, in
which Britons fight againƒt Britons, and the deƒcendants of Britons, let the
calamities immediately incident to a civil war ƒuffice. We hope additions
will not from wantonneƒs be made to them on one ƒide: We ƒhall regret the
neceƒsity, if laid under the neceƒsity, of making them on the other."
Extract from the Minutes,
Charles Thomson, Sec.
© 2008 - 2022 Revolutionary-War-and-Beyond.com Dan & Jax Bubis
Facebook Comments